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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Damian A. Ayarzagoitia appeals from his sentences for aggravated battery, with a
deadly weapon enhancement, and burglary.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Using a copy of a key he obtained while working for a janitorial company for six
days, Ayarzagoitia and an accomplice entered an office on two occasions and stole a
computer, a bicycle, and bottles of alcohol and vandalized the office by pouring substances
on surfaces and equipment. (PSI, pp. 5-6.) Ayarzagoitia smashed the computer he stole
and he and his accomplice drank the alcohol. (PSI, p. 6.) Ayarzagoitia explained that the
vandalism was intended to be revenge against his former employer, but he was mistaken
as to the actual owner of the office. (Id.)
Five days later, convinced that Ryan Garcia-Larimore was a “snitch,” Ayarzagoitia
and two others attacked and stabbed him multiple times. (PSI, pp. 3-6.) Ayarzagoitia
organized the attack. (Id.) The men struck Garcia-Larimore in the head in an attempt to
knock him unconscious and then stabbed him in the throat, neck, back of the head, and
over the right eye. (Id.) The victim reported that he believed the men had tried to murder
him, and that he was suffering from PTSD as a result. (PSI, pp. 6-7.)
The state charged Ayarzagoitia with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon
enhancement and a persistent violator enhancement for his attack on Garcia-Larimore. (R.,
pp. 54-55, 72-73, 81-82.) For breaking into, stealing from, and vandalizing the office the
state charged him with burglary, malicious injury to property, and three counts of petit
theft. (R., pp. 238-39.) Pursuant to a plea agreement Ayarzagoitia pled guilty to aggravated
1

battery with a deadly weapon enhancement and burglary, and the state dismissed the other
charges and enhancement. (R., pp. 113, 244.) The district court imposed a sentence of 30
years with 20 years determinate for the enhanced aggravated battery conviction (R., pp.
159-60) and ten years indeterminate for burglary with jail time on the misdemeanors (R.,
pp. 289-92). The court ran the aggravated battery and burglary sentences consecutively,
resulting in an aggregate sentence of 40 years with 20 years determinate. (R., p. 290.)
Ayarzagoitia filed motions for reconsideration or correction of sentence. (R., pp.
163-70, 299-302.) The district court denied the motions. (R., pp. 182-89, 313-20.)
Ayarzagoitia filed notices of appeal timely from his judgments. (R., pp. 137-41,
175-78, 268-72, 308-11.)
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ISSUES
Ayarzagoitia states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an
aggregate unified sentence of forty years, with twenty years fixed,
upon Mr. Ayarzagoitia following his pleas of guilty to one count of
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon sentencing enhancement,
one count of misdemeanor malicious injury to property, three counts
of misdemeanor petit theft, and one count of burglary?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Ayarzagoitia’s Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motions?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering Mr.
Ayarzagoitia to pay restitution to the Crime Victims Compensation
Program?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Ayarzagoitia failed to show the district court abused its sentencing discretion
either in its original sentence or in the denial of Ayarzagoitia’s Rule 35 motion?
2.
Has Ayarzagoitia failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
ordered him to pay restitution?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Ayarzagoitia Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
On the felony convictions for aggravated battery (enhanced by a deadly weapon

enhancement) and burglary the district court imposed an aggregate sentence of 40 years
with 20 years determinate. (R., pp. 159-60, 289-92.) Ayarzagoitia contends the district
court abused its sentencing discretion in light of his youth (he is 39), his mental health, and
his expressions of remorse and acceptance of responsibility. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7.)
Ayarzagoitia’s argument fails because it ignores the crimes, his character, his history, and
the district court’s reasoning. Ayarzagoitia also contends his sentence is excessive in light
of the information he submitted with his Rule 35 motions. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.)
Review shows this argument also fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard

considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d
387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State
v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of
the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v.
Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits,
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State
v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho
831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). Sentencing discretion is reviewed for three factors: “‘(1) whether
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the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court
acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.’”
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, ___, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151
Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse It Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must

establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v.
Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the
appellant met his burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision
to release him on parole is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that
the determinate portion will be the period of actual incarceration. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726,
170 P.3d at 391. To establish that the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that
reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Farwell,
144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. The “primary objective” of sentencing is “the protection
of society.” State v. Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540, 544, 376 P.3d 744, 748 (2016).
The district court applied the correct legal standards, and perceived its discretion
and the legal boundaries thereof. (Tr., p. 93, L. 19 – p. 94, L. 16.) It found that, at the
sentencing, Ayarzagoitia was 39 years old. (Tr., p. 96, L. 4.) The court found that
Ayarzagoitia was “a danger to the community” and that the offenses he committed were
“serious.” (Tr., p. 96, Ls. 22-24.) The court found that “a lesser sentence would depreciate
the seriousness of the offense,” especially the aggravated battery. (Tr., p. 96, L. 24 – p. 97,
5

L. 1.) The sentence was supported by the “victim impact,” and Ayarzagoitia’s “prior
criminal history” and his disciplinary record at the jail and prison. (Tr., p. 97, Ls. 2-5.)
The court considered Ayarzagoitia’s mental health, and concluded that it was primarily a
personality disorder that would be difficult to treat because Ayarzagoitia generally refused
treatment, including medication. (Tr., p. 97, Ls. 6-22.)
The district court’s analysis and findings are supported by the record. As noted
above, it applied the correct legal standards, which Ayarzagoitia does not dispute. It found
that Ayarzagoitia was 39 years old, which is supported by the evidence. (PSI, p. 1.) The
record certainly supports the findings that Ayarzagoitia is a danger to the community, that
his offenses were serious, and that his criminal history and record while incarcerated or on
release supported a finding of risk to the community. (PSI, pp. 3-7 (recitation of the
crimes), 7-10 (Ayarzagoitia’s extensive criminal record, including three prior felony
convictions), 10-13 (Ayarzagoitia’s performance in custody and on release), 20-21
(evaluated to be a high risk for recidivism).) Finally, that his mental health issues centered
on a personality disorder that would be difficult to treat is also established by the evidence.
(PSI, pp. 17-18, 35-41.)
Ayarzagoitia attempts to show an abuse of discretion by claiming the district court
did not “properly” consider mitigating circumstances including his age, his mental health,
and his expressions of remorse and acceptance of responsibly. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 67.) Ayarzagoitia’s argument ignores the district court’s analysis and makes no attempt to
address the factors supporting the sentence. He has therefore failed to show an abuse of
discretion.
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D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying The Rule 35 Motion
“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for

leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Burggraf, 160 Idaho 177,
180, 369 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v.
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).
Ayarzagoitia points to the following “new evidence” submitted with his request for
reconsideration: he was being medicated with a mood stabilizer (Appellant’s brief, p. 8
(citing R., p. 165)); he was denied housing in the “Behavioral Health Unit” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 8 (citing R., p. 165)); and he “expressed his concern that, without treatment, he
might reoffend” (Appellant’s brief, p. 8 (citing R., p. 165)). The district court reaffirmed
that the sentence was not excessive in light of Ayarzagoitia’s mental issues, and that
Ayarzagoitia had a low probability of rehabilitation.

(R., pp. 186-87, 317-18.)

Ayarzagoitia has failed to show an abuse of discretion.

II.
Ayarzagoitia Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Ordered Him To Pay Restitution
A.

Introduction
The district court ordered Ayarzagoitia to pay $59,283.32 to cover the victim’s

medical expenses, jointly and severally with his co-defendants. (Aug., pp. 35-45.) Of that
restitution, $25,000 was to the Crime Victims Compensation Program (“CVCP”) for its
payment of some of the aggravated battery victim’s medical bills. (Aug., pp. 35, 39.) On
appeal Ayarzagoitia acknowledges that CVCP is a “victim” for purposes of restitution, but
7

contends the district court erred by ordering restitution to CVCP because he lacks the
ability to pay. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-13.) Review of the record shows that Ayarzagoitia
has failed to show an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed to the

trial court’s discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412, 417 (Ct. App.
2013). The trial court’s factual findings in relation to restitution will not be disturbed if
supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276
(2013); State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011).

C.

Ayarzagoitia Has Failed To Show The Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering
Restitution To CVCP
Idaho’s restitution statute provides that the sentencing court “shall” order restitution

for economic loss actually suffered by the victim. I.C. § 19-5304(2). Nevertheless, the
court may decline to order restitution or order less than full restitution after considering
other factors, including “the financial resources, needs, and earning ability of the
defendant.” I.C. § 19-5304(3), (7). While a district court is required to consider these
factors, inability to pay neither precludes nor limits a restitution award; rather, ability to
pay is only one factor for a court’s consideration when it makes a discretionary restitution
determination. State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing
State v. Taie, 138 Idaho 878, 880, 71 P.3d 477, 479 (Ct. App. 2003)). In addition, “[t]he
immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and of itself, a reason
to not order restitution.” I.C. § 19-5304(7).
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Ayarzagoitia does not argue that the district court failed to consider his ability to
pay, only that it failed to “give sufficient weight” to his inability to pay. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 9-11.) This argument is unsupported by the law and the record. He also argues that
because CVCP has some discretion in what medical bills it pays the district court abused
its discretion. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14.) He fails, however, to establish that, even if
true, CVCP’s alleged discretion and source of funding is relevant. If CVCP had paid none
of the victim’s medical bills the amount of restitution would have been the same; the only
difference is to whom the restitution is owed. Ayarzagoitia has failed to show an abuse of
discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s judgment.
DATED this 13th day of June, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of June, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd

10

